The Incompleteness of Deductive Logic: A Generalization of Gödel’s Theorem

# Abstract

This paper demonstrates that deductive logic is incomplete, in the precise sense that there exists no recursive definition of the class of all logical truths. By generalizing Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, it is shown that the class of recursively defined logics is not itself recursively definable. The core result rests on a cardinality mismatch between recursive definitions and their power sets, echoing Cantor’s diagonal argument. The conclusion is that no logic, understood as a recursive truth-generating system, can capture the totality of logical truths. Gödel’s result is thus reframed as a special case of this more general recursion-theoretic incompleteness.

# 1. Introduction and Framework

We work in the context of classical first-order logic with equality, enriched by standard recursion theory. All sets and functions are assumed to be definable within ZFC set theory unless otherwise stated. A logic is formally defined as a recursively enumerable set of sentences φ ∈ Σ\*, where Σ is a finite alphabet. Each such logic is generated by a pair (S, Φ), where S is a finite base of axioms and Φ is a recursive inference operator. The deductive closure of (S, Φ) is denoted Post(S, Φ).  
  
This paper generalizes Gödel’s incompleteness theorem by showing that not only is arithmetic incomplete, but the entire class of recursive logics is itself not recursively definable. The strategy hinges on formal cardinality arguments and recursive function theory, thereby extending Gödel's insights to the meta-level of logic itself.

# 2. Definitions

Definition 2.1 (Recursive Function): A function f: ℕ → ℕ is recursive if there exists a Turing machine M such that for all n ∈ ℕ, M halts on input n and outputs f(n).  
  
Definition 2.2 (Posterity of α with respect to Φ): Let Φ be a recursive operator on Σ\*. Define Post(α, Φ) as the smallest set k such that:  
1. α ∈ k,  
2. ∀x ∈ Σ\*, if ∃y ∈ k such that Φ(y) = x, then x ∈ k.  
  
Definition 2.3 (Recursive Logic): A logic L is defined by a pair (S, Φ) with S ⊆ Σ\* finite and Φ recursive, and L = Post(S, Φ).  
  
Definition 2.4 (Recursive Definition Class K): The class of all such recursive procedures Φ used to define sets like ℕ, ℚ, etc.  
  
Definition 2.5 (Power Set): For any class K, P(K) denotes the set of all subsets of K.

# 3. Lemmas and Theorems

Lemma 3.1 (Cantor): |P(K)| > |K| for any set K.  
Proof Sketch: Assume |P(K)| = |K|. Then the diagonal subset of K cannot be in the image of any function f: K → P(K), contradicting surjectivity. □  
  
Lemma 3.2: There is no recursive definition of the real numbers ℝ.  
Proof: Any recursive enumeration of rationals can be diagonalized to generate a real not in the list. □  
  
Theorem 3.3: The class of all recursive definitions (K) is not recursively definable.  
Proof: Assume K is recursively enumerable. Then P(K) contains more elements than K due to Lemma 3.1, so K cannot enumerate P(K). Contradiction. □  
  
Theorem 3.4: The class of all logics (recursively defined statement-classes) is not recursively definable.  
Proof: Each logic L = Post(S, Φ) maps to a member of K. Since K is not recursively definable, neither is the set of such logics. □  
  
Corollary (Generalized Gödel): No recursive procedure can generate all logical truths.

# 4. Philosophical Significance

Gödel’s incompleteness theorem showed the limits of formal arithmetic. This paper extends that insight to logic itself. Any recursive system of logical truth generation (i.e., any formal logic) is inherently incomplete—not merely because of the limits of that system, but because the very class of such systems defies recursive definition.  
  
This underscores a fundamental limit to mechanized reasoning: there is no algorithmic means to capture logical truth in its entirety. Formal truth is always relative to some recursively defined (S, Φ), and the space of such pairs cannot be captured recursively.

# 5. Conclusion

This paper generalizes Gödel’s incompleteness result from arithmetic to deductive logic as such. By demonstrating that the class of all recursively defined logics is not recursively definable, it reveals the deeper reason for logical incompleteness: the cardinality mismatch between recursion and its own power set.  
  
No formal system, however broadly defined, can exhaust the space of logical truths. This result provides a metatheoretic capstone to Gödel’s original insight. □

# References

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